Search for: All records

Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The two parties typically have different, privately known valuations for the item, and ideally, they would like to trade if the buyer values the item more than the seller. The celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that any mechanism for this setting must violate at least one important desideratum. In this paper, we investigate a richer paradigm of bilateral trade, with many self-interested buyers and sellers on both sides of a single trade who cannot be excluded from the trade. We show that this allows for more positive results. In fact, we establish a dichotomy in the possibility of trading efficiently. If in expectation, the buyers value the item more, we can achieve efficiency in the limit. If this is not the case, then efficiency cannot be achieved in general. En route, we characterize trading mechanisms that encourage truth-telling, which may be of independent interest. We also evaluate our trading mechanisms experimentally, and the experiments align with our theoretical results. 

Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important yet previously overseen problem -- Coalition Structure Learning (CSL), where we aim to carefully design a series of games for the agents and infer the underlying coalition structure by observing their interactions in those games. We establish a lower bound on the sample complexity -- defined as the number of games needed to learn the structure -- of any algorithms for CSL and propose the Iterative Grouping (IG) algorithm for designing normal-form games to achieve the lower bound. We show that IG can be extended to other succinct games such as congestion games and graphical games. Moreover, we solve CSL in a more restrictive and practical setting: auctions. We show a variant of IG to solve CSL in the auction setting even if we cannot design the bidder valuations. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate IG in the auction setting and the results align with our theoretical analysis.